Security and non-goals

sealed-lattice currently ships a stable package boundary and safe-by-default helpers for transcript-core fixture verification, election foundation checks, and verification-oriented ballot privacy APIs, not a published voting workflow.

What the current release guarantees

• the workspace layout is explicit and package-boundary checked
• the published package identity is stable
• the public runtime facade exposes transcript-core fixture verification plus election foundation checks
• the public runtime facade verifies supported receiver-key proofs and ballot proof records through the packaged Rust/WASM backend, while scoped relation-bearing package acceptance stays fail-closed until verifier-derived lowering and trusted public randomness checks exist
• the election foundation verifies ML-DSA-65 signed-root envelopes for the current board, finality, roster-manifest, cast receipt, close record, and recovery helpers
• the Rust transcript-core builds, the published SDK loader verifies the packaged kernel hash before instantiation, and unpinned local WASM loader use requires an explicit test-only opt-in
• internal Rust/WASM commands derive reserved protocol digests and check the current GF(65537) interpolation/comparison relations used by the TypeScript reference layer
• local replay record, target-accepted-record, and decryption-share shell checks remain internal protocol coverage
• target-bound decryption capabilities fail closed unless a threshold profile includes a target-bound share-selection profile and the relevant proof certificates are explicitly present
• docs, smoke checks, browser coverage, vector manifest verification, and release workflow continue to verify the current boundary

What it does not guarantee yet

• no threshold voting workflow is published yet
• no ballot generation, casting, aggregation, tally, proof construction, semantic target-acceptance, or decryption API is public yet
• no voting correctness or secrecy claim is added by the transcript-core fixture path
• ballot privacy verification covers receiver-key proof and ballot proof-record checks only; scoped relation-bearing package shells are validated but not accepted as package-level claims yet
• internal deterministic PVSS ballot-algebra helpers are test infrastructure and do not provide production ballot confidentiality
• no caller should rely on private package names or future public subpaths becoming stable

Caller responsibilities

• treat the current public package as transcript-core fixture verification, election foundation checks, receiver-key proof verification, ballot proof-record verification, and fail-closed package shell validation, not as a usable voting library yet
• keep application logic off unpublished internal package names
• do not assume the current internal package split implies frozen future public APIs
• do not build protocol, proof-generation, or transport assumptions around unpublished APIs